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The Editorial on the Research Topic
How Best to “Go On”? Prospects for a “Modern Synthesis” in the Sciences of Mind
For some time, conceptual unity in psychology has been seen as both a scientific “holy grail” and
a feared hegemonic project—see, for example Observer (1982), Kantor (1984), and Dixon (1983).
This may be because a focus on integration, perhaps paradoxically, may intensify various tensions
within a psychology whose sub-disciplinary constitution actually reflects fault lines and dualisms
in the organization of knowledge more generally.
In recent years, we have seen new areas of theory and methods, including enactivism,
embodied cognition, discursive psychology, second-person neuroscience, developmental systems
theories, and a stunning growth in the neurosciences, genetics, and epigenetics. Our contributors
explore whether such advances have helped synthesize the diverse understandings of mind within
psychology. In so doing they frequently emphasize the unifying prospects of dynamic, adaptive,
action-orientated, “socialized,” systems-based, and embodied approaches, and are correspondingly
critical of reductionist, mechanistic approaches.
The articles are of two kinds. The first deals directly with the integration of the sciences of mind
and cognition as a broad project (Marshall; Stam; Andringa et al.). The second focuses on prospects
for synthesis within specific contexts of theory, method, and practice, including reciprocity (Berra)
psychiatric theory, and diagnosis (Castiglioni and Laudisa; Di Francesco and Marraffa) methods
for investigating consciousness (Olivares et al.); theories of vision (Laurent) and argumentation
(Lillo-Unglaube et al.).
Marshall’s proposal concerns relationships between “levels” in psychological understanding,
arguing that combining an embodied approach with a developmental systems account, within
a relational worldview, overcomes the conceptual “splitting off” of mind from brain and body.
He highlights the vital role that “pattern explanation” (akin to Aristotle’s formal cause) has in a
relational developmental systems approach, because it allows increased conceptual clarity over the
relations between a system’s organization and its activity and thus avoids reductionism.
With a similar focus on the integration of levels of explanation, Di Francesco and Marraffa
consider the relationship between consciousness (personal level) and the unconscious (sub-
personal level). They argue that, contra an eliminativist perspective, some personal level concepts
such as “motivation” and “attachment” can, in dialectical relationship with neuroscientific findings,
provide a useful indication of how personal and sub-personal levels of explanation can operate
together.
Relatedly, Castiglioni and Laudisa reject what they see as the reductionist, biological
underpinnings of the DSM-5 approach to psychiatric diagnosis. Their article speaks to a context
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where consistent evidence for the biological deficits purportedly
associated with the functional psychiatric diagnoses remains
elusive, and where major funders such as NIMH no longer
rely upon these diagnoses. Focusing on the DSM categorization
of depressive disorders and the removal of the “bereavement
exclusion clause”—and thus the continuing conflation of
“endogenous” and “reactive” categories of depression—they show
that reducing experiences of distress to quasi-medical symptoms
actually undermines theoretical and clinical accuracy.
Digging further into neurological findings, Laurent proposes
a new “Multiscale Enaction Model” of visual perception that
challenges a hard-wired, modular account. He suggests that
converging data indicate a need to acknowledge the multiple
systems at various scales that interconnect to create visual
experience.
With a similar focus on the relations between neurological
findings and phenomenological experience, Olivares et al.
examine the potential for “second-person methods”
(through interviews) to fulfill the promise of a unified
neurophenomenology. They argue that such methods provide
more systematic data than do direct first-person methods (e.g.,
introspection in both its strong and weak forms) and can help
bridge experiential and neurological descriptions of conscious
experience.
Berra addresses the important phenomena of altruism
and reciprocity in primate social groups. The aggregation of
individuals into socially-bonded and cooperative groups, she
argues, is best explained by emotional tracking of interactions—
rather than the more cognitively “expensive” bookkeeping
of expectations of rewards suggested in other theories. Her
parsimonious approach facilitates consistent explanations of
social reciprocity throughout primate groups that exhibit various
levels of cognitive capacity. It also suggests a theoretical synthesis
of emotional processes with the requirements of complex and
dynamic adaptive social behavior.
For humans, cooperation also often involves debates and the
making of arguments. As discursive psychology demonstrates,
these psychological processes are simultaneously fundamental to
political, legal, scientific, and educational discourse. The potential
synthesis of normative (“classical”) and cognitive approaches
to understanding human argumentation is investigated by
Lillo-Unglaube et al. They examine two argumentative fallacies
(the “slippery slope” argument, and the ad hominem argument),
and conclude that descriptive and experimental studies could
potentially integrate normative and cognitive research traditions
to produce an integrated body of theory on the psychology of
argumentation.
In their ambitious contribution, Andringa et al. provocatively
suggest that all cognition derives from two general modes that
are based on common tendencies in all life forms: the coping
mode, and the co-creation mode. The first is structured around
the goal of meeting immediate needs while the second operates
to construct environments within which pressing needs are less
likely to arise.
The selection concludes with Stam’s insightful argument over
the very idea of conceptual synthesis in the sciences of mind.
He proposes that psychology is in fact already relatively unified
methodologically, through the adoption of an “indeterminate
functionalism.” He then argues that the neurosciences, while not
acting to synthesize psychology, will nevertheless, influence our
understanding of being human—perhaps by coming to see the
brain as a technology that we use, but do not fully understand.
What, then, are the prospects for this “Modern Synthesis,”
and how should we best “go on?” Unsurprisingly, these papers
provide no unequivocal answer to these questions. What does
emerge, however, is that posing them raises many challenges—
across theory, method, and practice, and at a range of scales.
It is also clear that raising the issue of conceptual synthesis
reveals significant bumps and hollows in our understanding
of mind, and inspires innovative responses to those
challenges.
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